I’ve talked about a book before called Finding the Target, which is a criticism of the whole transformation debate that was occurring before 9/11. Schmitt is obviously making a point of overarching technology which is utopian. One is the idea of expeditionary advanced basing - if you’re going to do that then you better work on your network of international partners who will host these Marines and probably ask for some offsets and assurances.Īnyway, I have a love-hate relationship with this next argument: But the critics feel that there are many hard questions which have not been addressed. I was surprised by the supportive statements at the HASC hearing on the Marine Corps’ FY23 budget. General Berger wants to achieve Force Design 2030 without more money, which has meant $18 billion in program tradeoffs.Ĭertainly all levels of defense and congressional leadership has been aware of this. The short version of the result is less reliance on armor, artillery, and even a reduction of aircraft by more than 200 in favor of longer-range fires (e.g., Naval Strike Missile, MRLS), unmanned systems, and decentralized networked forces. One of the points critics make is that General Berger essentially asked mid-level officers to help formulate the plan without significant input from the combatant commanders or the retired generals. CDR Salamander also has a good post on the subject where he takes a middle of the road approach. If you missed the CSIS panel, be sure to give it a listen. The Marine Corps new Force Design 2030 led by Commandant Berger has created an impassioned debate, one that probably should have been had a long time ago.

John Schmitt, of course, mostly wrote the Marine Corps Doctrinal Publication 1: Warfighting under the leadership of General Alan Gray in 1989 - which really is a must read. That was from a very interesting episode of the All Marine Radio podcast: The Mensas discuss 6 articles that criticize Force Design 2030. We talked about careerism and careerists, we talked about attritionists, and now we have a new word in the lexicon and that’s defeatist. The last thing that he says, Chinese anti-access area-denial is formidable, without a doubt, but to assume it cannot be overcome is defeatist. A contest between those who see the past as prologue and those who see it as irrelevant.” He’s exactly right - airpower vs. John Schmitt starts his article: “The defining feature of the development US military policy is the tension that exists between the lessons of history and the promises of technology.

Iron marines war of attrition